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This paper offers a model of individual well-being that takes into account
cognitive factors.  It postulates that individuals compare payoffs to aspiration levels.
The latter are determined by past experiences (adaptation), by other people's
performance (interpersonal comparison), as well as by reasoning (justifications and
excuses).  We axiomatize a measure of well-being defined on real-valued vectors of
various lengths.  It is a linear combination of differences between payoffs and
aspiration levels, where the aspiration level at each instance is a linear function of
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1.  Introduction
Modern microeconomic theory is behavioral in nature.  For the most part, it
relies on the neo-classical utility function, which is in principle derived from
observed preferences, for both descriptive and normative applications.  Further, this
utility function is often defined on product bundles, disregarding psychological
factors that individuals seem to relate to in describing their well-being.
For descriptive purposes, this approach is consistent and it may be tested for
empirical validity.  By contrast, it is doubtful that a behaviorally-defined utility
function is sufficient when normative considerations are involved.  Welfare
economics ultimately deals with cognitive concepts such as "well-being,"
"happiness," and "satisfaction."  These relate to notions such as aspirations and
needs, contentment and disappointment.  The literature does not seem to offer a
convincing justification for substituting revealed preference for these concepts.
Moreover, the notion of "well-being" involves too many cognitive variables to
allow us to infer their values from choice data.  For instance, if we accept the view
that one's satisfaction is determined by one's consumption relative to one's needs,
we are faced with two subjective, cognitive variables, namely, "needs" and
"satisfaction," that cannot be disentangled based on objective consumption data
alone.
The goal of this paper is to suggest a model of individual well-being that
explicitly introduces some of the relevant cognitive variables.  Specifically, the key
assumption is that an individual's well-being depends on her aspirations, where
these are endogenously determined.  One may identify three major factors that
participate in the determination of an individual's aspiration level for a given
experience at a given time.  First, people adapt to circumstances.  Hence the
individual's own history of payoffs affects her aspirations.  For instance, when an
individual is accustomed to a certain standard of living, her well-being depends
mostly on deviations from it.  Second, people compare themselves to others in what
they perceive to be their peer group.  Thus, other people's payoffs are also
determinants of an individual's aspirations.  An increase in one's income may
make one worse off if it is accompanied by a decrease in one's income-ranking in
society.  Finally, various facts that do not directly relate to any single agent's
performance may give an individual reasons to expect higher or lower payoffs.  For
instance, if the economy is predicted to boom, individuals may be led to expect
higher income.  The fact that one grows old may decrease one's aspirationsGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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regarding one's health.  Aging is a fact that directly (and negatively) affects one's
well-being.  But it also helps one to accept, say, a decline in one's physical fitness.
Similarly, being discriminated against has a direct negative impact on an
individual's well-being.  But it can also account for perceived failures.  By adjusting
the individual's aspiration level, an "excuse" can mitigate the impact of low payoffs.
These considerations call into question some of the accepted tenets of welfare
economics.  For instance, it is not obvious that more choices or more opportunities
necessarily make an individual better off.  Choice comes with responsibility, and it
may result in regret.  Opportunity generates expectations, and may lead to low self-
esteem.  More generally, welfare analysis should take into account subjective
aspirations as well as objective performance.  While having more choices and
opportunities may improve the latter, it also tends to raise the former.  Its net effect
therefore need not always be positive.
For a concrete example, consider an integrative educational system, in which
children of different neighborhoods and of different socio-economic status (SES) are
put in the same school class.  Such a system presumably allows children of lower-
income families to have the same level of education as those of higher-income
families, thereby giving them an equal opportunity to succeed in their future
careers.  Undoubtedly, some children may benefit from the system in terms of their
objective performance.  However, many may experience a reduction in their
subjective well-being for two reasons.  First, the mere exposure to lifestyles of
higher-income families may make lower SES children view their life differently.
Their neighborhood, house, and consumption opportunities are likely to be seen as
less satisfactory than prior to their exposure to those of high SES children.  Second,
the semblance of "equal opportunity" deprives them of potential justifications for
low performance on objective scales.  Should a child end up with a low-paying job,
believing that she indeed had "equal opportunity" leaves her with no one but
herself to blame for her "failure."  Overall, it is not clear that such a system does
more good than harm.  It does seem clear, however, that economic theory lacks the
language to address this question.
A clarification is due before it becomes too late.  We do not intend to suggest
that people are better off in slavery than in liberty, that competition should be
abolished, or that all students should always get "A" grades.  Our goal is merely to
offer a theoretical framework within which some of the above phenomena can be
discussed.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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To this end, we suggest the following model.  An individual's history consists
of a sequence of facts.  Some are events that have a temporal aspect.  Some are
atemporal, such as religious or national identification.  Each fact t has an "objective"
payoff attached to it, denoted xt.  The individual's instantaneous payoff is defined as
xt - at, where at is the individual's aspiration level pertaining to that fact.  Overall
well-being is defined as a weighted sum of these instantaneous payoffs.  However,
the aspiration levels at are themselves linear functions of preceding objective
payoffs.  Explicitly, given a history  x = x1,..., xT () , the measure of well-being is
Ux () = w tx t- a t ()
t å
for given weights wt, where
at = sitxi i=1
t-1
å
for given coefficients sit.
Suppose that x is the individual's income stream.  An increase in income at
period i has a direct effect on the individual's well-being.  The larger is wi (assumed
positive), the happier will be the individual.  However, with positive coefficients sit
for t > i, the aspiration levels in future periods will be higher.  If the individual will
not experience high payoffs in these periods, she may be disappointed.  Moreover, if
the aspiration level is an average of recent periods' payoffs, a permanent increase in
income will have an effect mostly in the first periods, whereas in later ones the
aspiration level will be correspondingly adjusted and the instantaneous payoff will
diminish.
Assume now that x describes experiences of consumption of various goods,
including meals, entertainment, social life, and so forth.  Within each category,
similar logic applies.  Many of the coefficients sit may be null, reflecting the fact that
the individual's aspiration level for a certain experience depends only on
experiences of the same kind.  Yet, the measure of overall well-being is an
aggregation of all such experiences.
Note that, in the present formulation, current payoffs only affect future
aspiration levels.  The individual does not re-assess past experiences in view of
current payoffs or aspirations.  Thus, an individual who has a constant high incomeGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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will still be better off than one who has a constant low income, even though both
have become adjusted to their respective circumstances.  One may wish, however,
to consider a more general model, according to which aspirations are adjusted
retrospectively as well.
To capture the impact of interpersonal comparison, we incorporate into the
model facts involving protagonists other than the individual in question.  For
instance, assume that we are measuring the well-being of an individual A, who
knows that another individual, B, has a certain annual income.  Suppose that fact i
is that B has income xi.  The weight wi assigned to this payoff in the measurement
of A's well-being reflects A's attitude toward B.  Should it be positive, A would
rejoice at B's successes and lament her failures.  Naturally, a negative wi would
reflect a less benevolent attitude.  Finally, if wi is zero, B's income has no direct
impact on A's well-being.
However, even if wi is indeed zero, or if one maintains that, for normative
purposes, wi should be assumed zero (see Harsanyi (1992)), B's income may affect
A's aspiration level, and thus his well-being, via the coefficients sit.  A positive
value of sit would make A aspire to have a higher income, the higher is B's income.
Further, this social aspect may interact with the process of adaptation discussed
above.  Assume that every two weeks both A and B get their pay checks, and that A
knows B's previous payoffs.  We obtain a sequence of facts, in which the odd-
numbered ones are, say, A's salary, whereas the even-numbered ones reflect B's
salary.  Assume that A's salary is lower than B's, and that the aspiration level is a
weighted average of past periods' payoffs.  If left alone, A would have adjusted to his
income, and his U measure would tend to zero.  However, in the presence of the
constant reminder of B's higher income, A's U measure remains negative.
Observe that our interpretation of "aspiration level" is emotional rather than
rational.  That is, the aspiration level does not attempt to capture the individual's
reply to "What do you think you will get?" but rather "What would make you
content?"  In the example above, A cannot fail to notice that, pay period after pay
period, B gets a higher salary.  If asked, A would certainly be able to correctly predict
his next paycheck.  However, to the extent that A has not come to terms with this
salary difference, to the extent that he is bothered by it, feels that he is discriminated
against, and so forth – his aspiration level is affected by B's income.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Next consider examples of mental accounting.  An old woman finds that her
mental capacities are becoming limited.  She faces problems remembering names,
numbers, tasks, and so forth.  Of course, this is not good news.  However, she might
not be as unhappy about it as she would have been had these phenomena occurred
when she was young.  In our model, "growing old" would be one of the facts in the
woman's memory.  This fact is associated with a low payoff, and it reduced well-
being.  But, to the extent that the woman comes to terms with aging, this low payoff
also reduces her aspiration levels regarding her memory's performance.  This
would make future failures less painful, and mediocre successes – a source of joy.
Mental accounting also applies to one's self-esteem.  Consider a prospective
student who belongs to a minority group, say, defined by religion.  He is not
admitted to a top school, and he suspects that he might have been discriminated
against.  Being denied admission is not good news.  As in the previous example,
discrimination also means that the student suffers from unfavorable interpersonal
comparison.  Every equally qualified candidate who was admitted makes the
rejection more painful.  Moreover, the injustice of discrimination is infuriating in
and of itself.  However, given that one is not admitted, there may be some
consolation in the fact that this failure is not a reflection of one's true merit.  As far
as responsibility and self-esteem are concerned, the student may "deduct" his
religion from his objectively poor performance.  He is only responsible for the
unaccounted part of this low payoff.
The phenomena we attempt to capture in our model have been discussed in
the past.  Indeed, some of these discussions date back to religious thinkers of
previous millennia, and some have pervaded popular culture to the point of
banality.  To the extent that this paper makes a contribution, it is in offering a
simple, formal model that allows to discuss well-being and that captures the various
determinant of aspirations in a unified way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the model
and an axiomatization of the evaluation rule.  It also discusses monotonicity.
Section 3 discusses the relationship of our model to existing theories, and the extent
to which it can describe some empirical psychological findings.  We devote Section 4
to a discussion of welfare economics in light of our model.  Section 5 concludes.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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2.  Model and Result
A "fact" is a pair, of circumstances and payoff.  To simplify notation, we
assume that the circumstances are ordered, and identify them with the natural
numbers.  It should be borne in mind that they are not necessarily repetitions of
identical situations.  For instance, "circumstance" 3 may be belonging to a minority
group, "circumstance" 5 may be having a meal, and so forth.
The objects of comparison are histories, represented by real-valued vectors,
with generic notation xT = x1
T,..., xT
T () .  Since histories of different lengths are
involved, we will use superscripts to denote their lengths.  Thus, a symbol such as
xT denotes a real-valued vector of length T ³1, with generic component xi
T.  We
will use this notation also for real-valued vectors that are not interpreted as
histories (for instance, vectors of coefficients).  Finally,  xT,y ¢ T ()  denotes vector
concatenation.
When considering different values of xi
T, we refer to different possible facts,
all of whom share the circumstances, and vary only in the objective payoff.  For
instance, x3
T may take a low value if the individual in the example above was
discriminated against because he belonged to a minority group.  It would take a high
value if the individual still belonged to the same group, but benefited from this
identification.  In the sequel we assume that any real-valued payoff can be attached
to any circumstance, generating a meaningful fact.
Implicit in this notation is the assumption that all possible histories agree on
the order of circumstances.  That is, for any two histories, the vector of
circumstances of the shorter history is a prefix of the corresponding vector for the
longer one.  The model can be extended to deal with functions on arbitrary sets of
circumstances.  Yet, the present set-up contains sufficient information to derive the
functional form we are interested in, and its notation is simpler.  Further, no loss of
generality is involved in assuming that facts are linearly ordered, as opposed to
partially ordered.
Thus the set of objects of comparison is 
  
X ºÂ T
T = 1
¥
U , and ³ will denote a
binary order on it.  xT ³ y ¢ T  is interpreted to mean that a history xT makes an
individual at least as happy as a history y ¢ T .  While we are perfectly content with a
cognitive interpretation of this ordering, it can also be interpreted behaviorally.  ForGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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instance, one may prefer that one's child (or oneself) would experience xT rather
than y ¢ T , and may take actions that reflect such preferences.
One may wonder, how can histories of different lengths be compared?  For
instance, if T < ¢ T , xT may appear "better" than y ¢ T  simply because we are not told
what happens in history x after T.  Shouldn't we first find out what x entails?  The
answer is no.  If the interpretation of ³ is cognitive, there is no difficulty in
comparing well-being or happiness at different times.  Indeed, many people feel that
they were happier in their youth than in old age.  But even if ³ is behaviorally
interpreted, "facts" in our model need not be temporally defined, nor are they
required to be a complete description of one's life.  Rather, they are the subjectively
relevant facts.
We are interested in the following axioms on ³ (£, >, <, and » are defined as
usual):
A1: ³ is a weak order.
A2 (Continuity):    For every T, ¢ T ³1, and every xT, the sets  y ¢ T xT > y ¢ T {}  and
y ¢ T xT < y ¢ T {}  are open (in the standard topology) in Â ¢ T .
A3 (Additivity):  For every T, ¢ T ³1, and every xT,y ¢ T , zT,w ¢ T , if xT ³ y ¢ T  (xT >y ¢ T )
and  zT ³ w ¢ T , then xT + zT ³ y ¢ T + w ¢ T  (xT + zT > y ¢ T + w ¢ T ).
A4 (Neutral Continuation):  For every T ³1 and every xT there exists a ÎÂ such
that xT » xT, a () .
A1 and A2 are standard.  A3 is a straightforward additivity assumption.  It
makes sense mostly when the payoffs are interpreted as if they were measured in
"utiles."  Finally, A4 guarantees that for every history there is a continuation that
does not affect its desirability.  Intuitively, the value a reflects the individual
aspiration level following the experience xT.  Should the individual now
experience the payoff a, she would be just as content as before.  In the presence of
A2, one can derive A4 from the assumption that any history can be continued in a
way that would improve it, as well as in a way that would impair it.
Our main result is
Theorem:  The following are equivalent:
(i) ³ satisfies A1-A4;Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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(ii) There are real numbers  wt () t ³ 1  and  sit () t > i ³ 1  such that for every T, ¢ T ³1,
and every xT,y ¢ T ,
xT ³ y ¢ T iff Ux T () ³ Uy¢ T ()
where
Ux T () = w tx t
T - a t x T () ()
t = 1
T
å
and
at xT () = s it xi
T
i=1
t-1
å .
Furthermore, in this case the weights  wt () t ³ 1  are unique up to a
multiplication by a positive number, whereas, for every t >1,  sit () t > i ³ 1  are
unique whenever wt ¹ 0 (and arbitrary otherwise).
The proof is relegated to an appendix.
Under A1–A4, U need not be monotone with respect to the instantaneous
payoffs.  Indeed, since some of the payoffs may reflect other agents' experiences,
there is no need to assume that U is always monotone.  However, if we restrict
attention to facts that relate to the individual under consideration, lack of
monotonicity may be theoretically troublesome.  For instance, it allows that an
individual be better off not to get a one-time increase in income, due to future
disappointments.  Similarly, an individual might be better off when discriminated
against, or at least when believing he is.  While such rankings may be observed,
most people would not consider it ethical to rely on them in decision making
regarding other people's welfare.  For example, it is not very convincing to argue
that one should not give charity to homeless people, in order not to expose them to
future disappointments, or that all cases of discrimination are made up by weaklings
who cannot confront their own inadequacies.  We are therefore interested in the
following:
A5 (Monotonicity):  For every T ³1 and every xT, yT, if xt
T ³ yt
T for all t £ T, then
xT ³ yT.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Observation:  Under the assumption of the Theorem, ³ satisfies A5 iff
* () w i ³ s itwt
t=i+1
T
å for all i £ T
(in particular, wT ³ 0 for all T).
Condition  * ()  states that the direct (positive) impact a payoff xi has outweighs
the potential indirect (negative) impact it has on future aspiration levels.  In view of
the uniqueness result in the Theorem, this condition does not depend on the
specific numbers chosen to represent ³.
Monotonicity does not imply that the coefficients sit are nonnegative.  On the
contrary, the lower are sit's, the larger is the cone of  wt () t ³ 1  that define a monotone
relation.  A negative value of sit may result from several reasons.  First, payoff in
circumstance i may be perceived to be negatively correlated with performance in
circumstance t.  For instance, one may be happy that one is honest, but consequently
one may not expect to be considered very polite.  Second, an individual may
experience satiation.  In this case, high payoffs in some early circumstances may
reduce her aspiration level in later ones.  (This may also result in changing the
coefficients wT.  Such dependencies are beyond the scope of the linear model.)
3.  Psychological Evidence and Related Theories
The term "aspiration level" is borrowed from Simon (1957), who argued that
people "satisfice," rather than optimize in decision making.  A payoff that exceeds
the aspiration level makes the decision maker "satisficed," and thereby prone to
retain the status quo, whereas a payoff that falls below it prods her to experiment.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) suggest a model of decision under uncertainty that
provides a behavioral definition of "aspiration levels."  However, we do not focus
on the decision-making aspect in this paper, and the present interpretation of
"aspirations" differs from the behavioral one.  A rational decision maker may
behave as if she were satisficed because she knows that she has no better option than
her current choice.  Yet, if she is unhappy, she is below the "emotional" aspiration
level we use in this paper.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Adaptation level theory, developed by Helson (1964), suggests that people
adjust to various stimuli.  The theory deals with phenomena ranging from
perception to happiness and to learning and creative thinking.  It postulates that the
adaptation level is a geometric average of a "background" level and a series of
stimuli.  (These terms are borrowed from the case visual perception.)  Since we
focus on aspiration level adjustments, the formal concept of "aspiration" in our
model bears kinship to adaptation level.  Specifically, on a logarithmic scale,
Helson's formula for the adaptation level becomes very similar to the linear one we
use for the aspiration level.
Adaptation level theory focuses on the measurement of an instantaneous
sensation, rather than on the concept of overall well-being.  It thus corresponds to
expressions of the type xt - at in our model, and does not deal with aggregation
thereof.  In contrast, our overall measure of well-being, U, is cumulative in nature.
It attempts to measure how happy an individual is throughout a sequence of
experiences, or how desirable such a sequence is.  Correspondingly, two individuals
who are fully adjusted to their respective income levels might be equally happy
according to adaptation level theory, while the richer individual would still have a
higher  U value in our model.  Still, the assessment of instantaneous payoffs
relative to an adapting aspiration level finds support in the psychological literature
on adaptation level theory.  (See Appley (1971).)
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) studied lottery winners and their
self-reported happiness.  They found that recent winners were not happier than
were control subjects.  They explain this phenomenon using adaptation level
theory, by the concepts of contrast and of habituation:  shortly after the lottery, in
contrast to the moment in which the winners were informed of their gains, they
were no longer as happy.  Similarly, it is postulated that they became habituated to
their new wealth level.  In our model, habituation is captured by the adjustment of
the aspiration level.  In order to satisfactorily model contrast, however, one may
wish to extend the model by allowing the weights  wt () t ³ 1  to depend on the
instantaneous payoffs:  a single period in which the payoff was exceptional may,
because of this payoff, play a more major role in the determination of future
aspiration levels.  (Other studies relating to aspiration level adjustments include
Payne, Laughunn, and Crum (1980, 1981), March (1988) and Mezias (1988).)
There is ample evidence that subjective well-being can hardly be
approximated by real income.  Campbell (1981) argues that "people react to the world
as they perceive it, not as it objectively is" (p. 23), and studies self-reported happinessGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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across various income and education levels in the US over time.  For instance, from
1957 to the early 1970's, the proportion of American population who were prepared
to describe themselves as "very happy" declined from 35% to 24%; by 1978, it has
risen to 30%.  These shifts "are in direct opposition to the national economic trends"
(p. 28).  Perhaps more significantly, these proportions are at a very low correlation
with income and with education levels.  (See also Schoemaker (1982), Diener (1984),
Duncan (1975), and Easterlin (1974).)  This evidence is consistent with our model:  a
high-income individual is likely to be better off than a low-income one, but, since
the aspiration levels of both adjust over time, measures of their long-run well-being
need not be drastically different.
Kahneman and Varey (1991) discuss adaptation level theories, and suggest
that utility may be derived from transitions no less than, and perhaps more than
from states (see also Kahneman (1994)).  Relatedly, Fredrickson and Kahneman
(1993) find that the way people retrospectively evaluate affective episodes (viewing
film clips in their studies) is barely related to their duration.  They dub this
phenomenon "duration neglect."  Moreover, Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber
and Redelmeier (1993) have found that, due to duration neglect, people may choose
more pain over less:  they exposed subjects to a painful experience (60 seconds of
holding one's hand in water at 14°c), and then to the same experience followed by a
better, but still painful, end (additional 30 seconds of holding the hand in water that
gradually warmed up to 15°c).  A significant majority of the subjects preferred to
repeat the longer experience.
Duration neglect is captured by our model if the aspiration level is adjusted
fast enough.  Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) also report that individuals'
retrospective evaluations of affective episodes significantly depend on the peak and
the end levels of affect.  End effects are compatible with our model.1  However, peak
effects (as the concept of "contrast" mentioned above) call for a generalization
according to which the weights  wt () t ³ 1  depend on the instantaneous payoffs.  It
should be noted that Kahneman and his colleagues discuss the effects of memory, as
well as one's ability to predict one's taste.  It is not clear that the way experiences are
remembered is the yardstick by which well-being should be measured.  Yet, the
evidence provided by these studies supports the principle on which our model is
based.
1 This may be more clearly seen from an equivalent mathematical representation of the
evaluation functional.  See Appendix.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
12
Interpersonal comparisons of income, status, and utility have probably
received economists' attention more than other determinants of an individual's
aspiration level.  Veblen (1899) has already discussed conspicuous consumption (see
also Leibenstein (1948)).  Duesenberry (1949) has formulated the relative income
hypothesis, stating that saving rates depend on a family's percentile position in the
income distribution.  Hirsch (1976) further emphasized the role of relative social
status.  Hayakawa and Venieris (1977) discuss the consumer's "reference group" in
this context.  Interpersonal comparisons are also at the basis of the concept of "envy-
free" allocations introduced by Foley (1967) (see also Schmeidler and Vind (1972),
Pazner and Schmeidler (1974), and Varian (1974)).  Frank (1985a, 1985b, 1989) argues
that an individual's consumption is compared to that of others, as well as to past
consumption, thus combining adaptation with interpersonal comparisons.
Kapteyn, Wansbeek, and Buyze (1980) and Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1982, 1985) argue
that utility is completely relative.  Ng and Wang (1993) present a model that
captures aspiration level and interpersonal comparisons effects, as well as
environmental factors.  (Other studies include Rainwater (1974), Layard (1980),
Tomes (1986), Seidman (1987), Congleton (1989), and Persky and Tam (1990).)  In this
context, the present paper suggests a formal, axiomatically-based model that captures
interpersonal comparisons as well as other factors affecting aspirations, in a unified
way.
Another phenomenon our model attempts to capture is that one's well-being
depends on reasons, justification, and excuses one may have for objectively poor
performance.  When pushed to an extreme, this cognitive phenomenon may be
reflected in behaviorally observed preference for situations in which one is
constrained, or "objectively" disadvantaged.  Such preferences are called "self-
handicapping" in the psychological literature.  For instance, Berglas and Jones (1978)
have conducted an experiment in which subjects were administered a drug prior to
engaging in a problem-solving task.  The subjects were asked to choose between two
drugs.  One was described as enhancing performance, whereas the second was
allegedly interfering with performance.  Some subjects (mostly male) chose the drug
that was alleged to induce poorer performance.  According to Berglas and Jones, the
only plausible explanation for this choice is to provide oneself with an excuse for
failure to solve the problem.  (See also Tice and Baumeister (1990)).  In our model,
such a choice is explained by a higher U value in the presence of a fact that mayGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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serve as an excuse.  (Note, however, that this type of preference violates the
monotonicity axiom.)
Berglas and Jones also allowed subjects to choose the level of difficulty of the
task.  They found that "subjects high in fear of failure show a tendency to prefer
either very simple or very difficult tasks, tasks typically low in diagnosticity"  (pp.
405-6).  McClelland (1961) has argued that not everyone wants to have "concrete
knowledge of results of choices and actions" (p. 231).  (See also Sedikides (1993) and
Trope (1979) regarding preference for diagnosticity.)
The tendency to choose a task that would not provide much information
regarding one's abilities may be explained by our model:  failing on a task that is
known to be difficult is less painful than failing on one that is supposed to be
manageable.  The fact that the task is difficult reduces one's aspiration level
regarding one's performance on it.  Thus, in case of failure, the resulting U value
would be higher in case of a difficult task than it would be in case of a simpler one.
4.  Welfare Economics
Measuring well-being by a "utility" index introduces the temptation to adopt
various axioms that are well accepted in the context of the neo-classical utility
function, or of income.  For instance, Pigou (1920) has introduced an axiom of social
welfare, according to which a transfer of income from a high-income individual to a
low-income one, that does not reverse their income ranking, enhances equality.
Applying this axiom to our model verbatim may result in the suggestion that a
satisficed individual be taxed in order to subsidize an unsatisficed one.
Such a suggestion is patently absurd as a general principle.  The satisficed
individual may be much poorer than the unsatisficed one.  In this case, the transfer,
which is Pigouvian on a subjective scale, is clearly non-Pigouvian on an objective
one.  It hardly seems just to tax someone simply because they happen to have a low
aspiration level.  Further, this policy is easily manipulable, since it provides
individuals with an incentive to overstate their aspirations.
However, in some cultures it is not uncommon to observe transfers from
elderly parents to adult children that follow this pattern, and appear to be viewed as
morally acceptable by both sides.  Especially if the parents have consumption habits
and aspiration levels that were shaped in less affluent periods, they may find that
they "have no use" for part of their income, whereas their children, despite their
higher income, can easily spend more.  (For a related phenomenon regardingGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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consumption patterns, see a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal of July 8,
1996.)
Moreover, any reference to a "status quo" as a basis for a moral right or claim
may be viewed as an implicit recognition of (adjusted) aspiration levels as an ethical
reference point.  Specifically, the legal system appears to accept a divorced spouse's
claim for a certain standard of living, a tenant's right to a certain bound on rent
increase, and so forth.
Aspiration levels in their original psychological meaning may be too
subjective and too easily manipulable to serve as a basis for normative arguments in
interpersonal interactions.  But they do seem to capture some intuitive notions of
"what is fair" that economic theory tends to ignore.
Another dangerously simplistic conclusion that may be associated with our
model is that, since aspirations adapt, there is no point in attempting to improve
objective conditions of human life.  Indeed, based on adaptation level theory,
Brickman and Campbell (1971) make a similar point, and argue that "there is no
true solution to the problem of happiness" but "getting off the Hedonic Treadmill."
(See also Thurow (1971, 1973, 1975, 1980) and Ittleson, Proshansky, Rivlin, and
Winkel (1974).)
While many philosophers and religious preachers have offered similar
arguments over the years, this is a rather dangerous position for a social scientist.
First, as noted by Kahneman and Varey (1991), not all experiences are subject to
adaptation.  On the contrary, some aversive experiences escalate with time.
Examples such as hunger and other forms of physical deprivation illustrate.
Second, adaptation and habituation are constrained by the social context.  An agent
may never be satisficed with a given level of income should all around her enjoy
higher levels of income.  Finally, a distinction should be drawn between a
normative recommendation for an individual and for a society.  An individual may
choose to step off the "Hedonic Treadmill"; but one can hardly be excused for
pushing others off it, leaving more space for oneself.
Yet, aspiration levels can be modified by education, exposure to information,
and adaptation.  Further, it is sometimes easier to reduce aspirations than it is to
improve objective payoffs.  The psychological literature provides evidence that
people typically are not fully aware of potential effects of adaptation and of
aspiration level adjustments.  Studies such as Kahneman and Snell (1990, 1992), and
Loewenstein and Adler (1995) conclude that, partly due to these processes, manyGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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individuals are poor predictors of their own future tastes.  It follows that normative
economics should take these considerations into account.  (See also Scitovsky (1976)
who argued that consumers need not know "what's best for them.")
In our model, the lower are an individual's aspiration levels, the happier she
is.  One may conclude that, given the choice, as, say, in the case of educating a child,
we should select the lowest aspirations possible.  But this would be premature.  First,
due to adaptation and interpersonal comparisons, aspiration levels are never fully
controlled.  Hence we cannot claim to have found a "shortcut to happiness" that is
independent of objective payoffs.  Second, the latter are not independent of the
aspiration levels.  Specifically, higher aspiration levels prod experimentation, which
may lead to objectively higher payoffs.  Indeed, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) shows
that ambitious but realistic aspiration level adjustments lead to objectively optimal
choice.  Thus, reducing a person's aspiration level makes her happier given the
same objective payoffs, but may also negatively affect the payoffs she is likely to get.
Striking the balance between the positive and the negative effects of ambition is
therefore a delicate matter.
Our model highlights welfare implications that information might have.  For
example, information about other agents' income may have direct effects on one's
well-being.  Moreover, if aspiration levels are more readily adjusted upward than
they are downward, one may argue that, on average, people are better off knowing
less; or that a more segregated society would allow more people to feel that they are
"Number One."  This is a dangerous idea.  It may serve various political causes.  As
explained above, it may also hinder objective progress.  But it would be wrong to
pretend that information has no subjective cost.
Similarly, one may argue, with various degrees of honesty, that segregation
and even discrimination are beneficial to disadvantaged, or discriminated-against
populations.  Again, an outrageous notion.  Yet, it is a mistake to avoid such
arguments by choosing a theoretical model that does not even allow their
formalization.
To conclude, there appear to be many more claims that we are not willing to
make than that we are.  It is entirely possible that, from a normative point of view,
little can be said at this level of generality.  We hope, however, that the model
presented here may be of help in discussing some specific normative issues.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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5.  Concluding Comments and Further Research
5.1 According to cognitive dissonance theories (Festinger (1957)), people tend to
provide post-hoc explanations for various facts.  For instance, when a certain
activity results in a low monetary payoff xt, the individual may attempt to believe
that there were other reasons to engage in this activity.  In our model, this can be
viewed as an adjustment of the coefficients sit for i < t.  Assuming that preceding
facts should have decreased the aspiration level for fact t, the individual's current
well-being increases.  (See also Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) on preferences
for choices that can be more readily justified.)
5.2 When facts involve other agents as protagonists, they may be ordered in
more than one way.  In particular, one may wish to list a temporal fact according to
its time of occurrence, rather than the time in which it became known to the agent.
Alternatively, one can use an extension of the model in which, as above, the
coefficients sit may be adjusted retrospectively.
5.3 Another extension of this model would differentiate between upward and
downward adjustments of the aspiration levels.  It appears that people "get used" to
higher payoffs more readily than to lower ones.  In particular, this assumption may
partly explain such economic phenomena as wage rigidity.
5.4 Under the assumption that aspiration levels adjust upward faster that they do
downward, applying utilitarian criteria to our measure of individual well-being
would result in preference for equality.
5.5 Modeling justifications explicitly allows to capture some aspects of regret
theories.  For instance, having less options may serve as a justification for a given
choice and its outcomes.  Correspondingly, it can reduce regret.
5.6 With normative applications in mind, one might wonder to what extent our
theory describes "rational" evaluation of well-being.  For instance, can such
phenomena as minimization of cognitive dissonance be part of a rational
evaluation model?
We tend to answer this particular question in the negative.  Knowingly
adjusting one's beliefs to match actual performance has a flavor of irrationality.
Specifically, such an exercise may fail should the individual be fully aware of the
analysis of her cognitive processes.  (See Gilboa (1991) for a related definition of
"rationality.")  However, there appears to be nothing irrational in an individual
taking into account her future habituation to, say, high income.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Our approach is to start out with a cognitively plausible descriptive theory,
and to study within it the boundaries of rationality, and of practical normative
recommendations.
5.7 The term "normative science" is used with more than one meaning.  Should
a normative scientist devise algorithms to obtain given goals?  Or should she tell
people what goals they should have?  We find it useful to define the role of the
normative scientist as separate from that of the engineer, as well as from that of the
preacher.  Rather than taking goals as given, or determining what they should be,
we focus on the scientist's task of modeling and analyzing the moral and ethical
preferences of decision makers, such as the preferences over societies one might
belong to.2  To the extent that our model might have normative implications, it is
in this light that they should be construed.
2 In this sense, normative theories are descriptive.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Appendix:  Proofs and Related Comments
Proof of the Theorem
The necessity of the axioms and the uniqueness result are straightforward.
We therefore prove only sufficiency, i.e., that (i) implies (ii).  It may be convenient
to prove this result in two steps.  Noting that U is a linear functional, we first derive
a more explicit linear representation.  We then show that this representation is
algebraically equivalent to U.  Specifically, we state two propositions:
Proposition  1:  Assume that ³ satisfies A1-A4.  There exist real valued vectors
bT () T ³ 1
 such that:
(a)  for every T >1, bT
T ¹ 0 or [bt
T = bt
T-1 for all t < T];
(b)  for every T, ¢ T ³1, and every xT,y ¢ T ,
xT ³ y ¢ T iff bT ×xT ³ b ¢ T ×y ¢ T
where × denotes inner product.
Proposition 2:  For every T ³1, define wT = bT
T.  For T >1, if bT
T ¹ 0, define
siT =
bi
T-1 -bi
T
bT
T  ,
and if bT
T = 0, define siT = 0.
Then, for every T ³1, and every xT,
Ux T () = b T × x T
where
Ux T () = w tx t
T - a t x T () ()
t = 1
T
å
and
at xT () = s it xi
T
i=1
t-1
å .
Thus Proposition 2 guarantees that the numerical representation of
Proposition 1 and that in part (ii) of the Theorem are equivalent.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that ³ satisfies A1-A4.  The proof proceeds in several steps.
Lemma 1:  For every T ³1, and every xT, yT, and zT, xT ³ yT iff xT + zT ³ yT + zT.
Proof:  A repeated application of A3.
Lemma 2:  For every T ³1 there exists a vector bT such that for every xT, yT,
xT ³ yT iff bT ×xT ³ bT ×yT.
Moreover, each bT is unique up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Proof:  Note that the restriction of ³ to ÂT is a continuous weak order (by A1 and
A2).  In view of Lemma 1, the proof is standard.
Select a sequence of vectors  √ bT ()
T ³ 1
 provided by Lemma 2.  We wish to show
that each can be re-scaled such that together they represent preferences across
different ÂT's as well.  To this end, we use a few auxiliary lemmata.
Lemma 3:  For every T, ¢ T ³1, the set  xT,y ¢ T () x T > y ¢ T {}  is open (in the standard
topology) in ÂT+ ¢ T .
Proof:  Endow the set 
  
X =Â T
T = 1
¥
U  with the topology whose base is the union of the
standard topologies on each ÂT.  (Convergence in this topology requires that a net
consist of vectors of identical lengths from some element on, and that they converge
in the corresponding topology.)   X is a separable metric space; a metric for it can be
defined by
dx T , y¢ T () =
T - ¢ T if T ¹ ¢ T
lx T - y ¢ T () if T = ¢ T
ì
í
ï
î ïGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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where  l(a) = min a,1 ()  and  ×  denotes the Euclidean distance in the appropriate space.
Hence, by Debreu (1983) (Ch. 6, Theorem II, p. 109), ³ admits a continuous real-
valued representation.  This implies the desired result.
In the following, 0T denotes the origin in ÂT.
Lemma 4:  For every T ³1, 0T » 0T+1.
Proof:  If not, consider a pair xT and yT+1 such that xT » yT+1.  (The existence of
which is guaranteed by A4.)  Using A3, one obtains a contradiction.
Lemma 5:  For every T, ¢ T ³1, and every xT,y ¢ T , xT ³ y ¢ T  iff -xT £-y ¢ T.
Proof:  Otherwise, A3 would lead to a contradiction to Lemma 4.
Lemma 6:  For every T, ¢ T ³1, every xT,y ¢ T , and every l > 0, xT ³ y ¢ T  iff lxT ³ ly ¢ T .
Proof:  It is sufficient to prove the "only if" part.  Inductive application of A3 proves
it for a natural l .  Similarly, A3 proves that xT > y ¢ T  implies nxT > ny ¢ T .  Thus the
"only if" part follows for every positive rational l .  Lemma 3 concludes.
Lemma 7:  For every T ³1, if  √ bT ¹ 0T, then  √ bT+1 ¹ 0T+1.
Proof:  Otherwise, there is xT > 0T, but for all aÎÂ,  xT,a () » 0 T + 1 » 0 T < x T ,
contradicting A4.
Completion  of the Proof of Proposition 1:  We now turn to define the vectors
bT () T ³ 1
 as positive multiples of the respective  √ bT ()
T ³ 1
.  If all the  √ bT vanish, then, by
Lemmata 2 and 4, all vectors in X are equivalent, and the proof is complete.  Let T0
be the first number for which  √ bT does not vanish.  By Lemma 7,  √ bT ¹ 0T for every
T > T0 as well.
For  T < T0, bT = √ bT is uniquely defined (as the origin).  For T0, set b
T0 = √ b
T0.
We now wish to show by induction on T ³ T0 that there exists a > 0 such that, by
defining bT = a √ bT, the vectors  bt () t £ T
 represent ³ for all vectors of length T or lessGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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(where representation is defined as in part (b) of Proposition 1).  Note that this claim
holds for T0.
Assume that the claim is true for T(³ T0), and we prove it for T +1.  In view
of A4, it suffices to find a > 0 such that bT+1 = a √ bT+1 would satisfy
xT ³ yT+1 iff bT ×xT ³bT+1×yT+1   .
Choose  xT >0T.  Let yT+1 satisfy xT » yT+1.  (Again, existence of such yT+1 is
guaranteed by A4.)  By Lemmata 2 and 4,  √ bT+1×yT+1 > 0.  We can therefore define
a =
bT ×xT
√ bT+1×yT+1 > 0   ,
so that bT ×xT = bT+1×yT+1.
Let there be given xT,yT+1.  Distinguish among three cases:
(i) If xT » 0T » 0T+1, i.e., bT ×xT = 0, then xT > (»,  <)yT+1 iff 0T+1> (»,  <)yT+1.  By
Lemma 2, this is the case iff bT ×xT = 0 = bT+1×0T+1 > (=, <) bT+1×yT+1.
(ii) If xT > 0T » 0T+1, i.e., bT ×xT > 0, there exists l > 0 such that lxT » xT.  By Lemma
6, xT > (», <)yT+1 iff lxT > (», <)lyT+1, i.e., iff yT+1> (»,  <)lyT+1, which (by Lemma
2 again) is equivalent to bT+1×yT+1> (=,  <)  lbT+1×yT+1.  Since bT+1×yT+1= bT ×xT =
lbT ×xT, it follows that xT > (», <)yT+1 iff bT ×xT > (=, <) bT+1×yT+1.
(iii) Finally, if xT < 0T » 0T+1, i.e., bT ×xT < 0, by Lemma 5, xT > (»,  <)yT+1 iff -xT <
(», >)-yT+1.  Using case (ii) above, this is equivalent to -bT ×xT < (=,  >)  -bT+1×yT+1,
and therefore also to bT ×xT > (=, <) bT+1×yT+1.
Finally, we prove that the vectors  bT () T ³ 1
 satisfy part (a) of the Proposition.
For every T ³1, if bT
T ¹ 0, we are done.  If, however, bT
T = 0, use A4 to conclude that
yT » yT,a ()  for every yT and every a ÎÂ.  By the representation of ³ as in part (b),
xT ³ yT » yT,a () iff bt
Txt
T
t=1
T
å ³ bt
T+1yt
T
t=1
T
å
for every xT, yT.  This implies that bt
T+1 = bt
T for all t £ T, and thus completes the
proof of Proposition 1.  áñGilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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Proof of Proposition 2
For every a ÎÂ, Ua () = w 1 a = b 1
1 a .  For T >1, assume that Ux t () = b t × x t  has
been proved for every t < T and every xt.  Consider xT, and denote its  T -1 () -long
prefix by xT-1.  Then
bT ×xT = bi
Txi
T
i=1
T-1
å +bT
TxT
T = bi
T-1xi
T
i=1
T-1
å + bi
T -bi
T-1 () x i
T
i = 1
T - 1
å + b T
T x T
T
= b i
T - 1 x i
T
i = 1
T - 1
å + b T
T x T
T -
b i
T - 1 - b i
T
b T
T
æ
è ç
ö
ø ÷ x i
T
i = 1
T - 1
å
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
= Ux T - 1 () + w T x T
T - s iTxi
T
i=1
T-1
å
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
= Ux T ()   . áñ
Remark 1:  By definition, wT are linear functions of  bT () T ³ 1
.  Conversely, it can be
seen that  bT () T ³ 1
 are uniquely defined by bT ×xT = Ux T () , and are linear functions of
wT () T ³ 1 .  Explicitly,
bi
T = wi - sitwt
t=i+1
T
å   .
Remark 2:  In the absence of A4, the Theorem does not hold.  For instance, ³ may
rank vectors lexicographically, first by length, and then according to bT within each
ÂT.
Further, A4 cannot be replaced by assuming, say, that 0T » 0T+1 for every T.
To see this, define ³ by the following function:
Ux () = x for all x ÎÂ
Ux T () = 2 x 1
T for all xT with T >1.
³ satisfies A1-A3, and the condition 0T » 0T+1, but does not satisfy A4.Gilboa and Schmeidler Individual Well-Being
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